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Scala Civium: Citizenship Templates Post-Brexit and the European Union’s 
Duty to Protect EU Citizens 
Dora Kostakopoulou 
(The final version of this article is forthcoming in the Journal of Common Market Studies) 
I. Introduction 
Legal realities are complex constructs designed to reflect and to condition social and political 
realities. Beneath the layer of objectivity, however, there exists an experiential reality relating 
to the applicability, and relevance, of legal rules to the daily lives of individuals.
1
 Empowered 
by the establishment of European Union citizenship at Maastricht,
2
 influential rulings by the 
Court of Justice of the EU,
3
 the adoption of the Citizenship Directive in 2004,
4
 and a number 
of decisions, reports and programmes adopted by the European Union institutions,
5
 European 
Union citizens have been increasingly keen to exercise their fundamental rights of free 
movement and residence under the Treaties. Notwithstanding the existence of formal EU 
citizenship rules, however, EU citizens have experienced, and continue to experience, 
obstacles in their daily lives.
6
 But the impact of such obstacles has been tempered by the 
                                                          
1
 Legal formalism was criticised by the American legal realist movement.  Its protagonists were Oliver Wendel 
Holmes (1841-1935), Karl Llewellyn (1893-1962) and Jerome Frank (1889-1957). Sociological research also 
commented on the existence of multiple realities. See Alfred Schutz, (1945).  
2
  Treaty on European Union, OJ C 191 of 29.7.1992. The Treaty entered into force on 1 November 1993. 
3
 For an overview, see Kostakopoulou (2015, pp. 170-3). 
4
 Directive 2004/38/EC, OJ L 229 of 29.6.2004. 
5
 For an overview, see B. de Witte and H.-W. Micklitz (eds.) (2012). 
6
 See EU citizenship consultation 2015, European Commission, Luxembourg 2016, ISBN 978-92-79-57029-2. 
The consultation provides a detailed account of EU citizens’ perceptions and views on their Union citizenship 
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realisation that in the eyes of the law they are almost equal partakers in collective processes 
and practices in the Member States of residence.
7
  
Sharing a community of space necessarily implies a ‘shared’ or ‘intersubjective’ time. 
Interestingly, EU citizens have never been placed in the periphery of host societies or in a 
state of probation until they meet integration conditions imposed by the host communities. 
This is forbidden by EU law. Their co-presence as contributors, collaborators and burden-
sharers has been authorised by the Treaties and European Union law has consistently ensured 
that no ‘patriot games’ played by state elites or non-governmental groups could deny them 
‘shared’ or ‘public’ time. And ‘sharing a community of time implies that each partner 
participates in the on-rolling life of another … . In brief, consociates are mutually involved in 
one another’s biography’ (Alfred Schutz, 1953, reprinted in Natanson, 1963, p. 316).  
 The outcome of the referendum on the UK’s continued membership of the European 
Union on 23 June 2016 has fractured shared communities of space and time across the EU.  
Brexit opened the way for the ‘restoration’ of British sovereignty and, if an EEA model (or 
an EEA-like model) is ruled out, EU citizens settled in the UK will have to apply for either 
UK nationality or indefinite leave to remain.
8
 The same applies to UK nationals permanently 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
rights as well as on their experiences of living in another country.  See also EU Citizenship Report 2010, 
Dismantling the obstacles to EU Citizens’ Rights, COM (2010) 603 final, Brussels 27.10.2010, p. 2; 2016 
Standard EB on EU Citizenship and EU Citizenship Report 2017 (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the EU).  
7
 EU citizens do not have the right to vote in national parliamentary elections in the Member State of 
residence. And they cannot apply for civil service positions that involve the exercise of official authority and 
are associated with rights and duties stemming from the bond of nationality. On the conditions attached to the 
rights of entry and residence, see chapters II and III of Directive 2004/38, n. 4 above. 
8
 In November 2016, Mr Guy Verhofstadt, suggested the idea of ‘associate citizenship’ in the UK. The idea did 
not gain currency because the creation of associate citizenship would require a Treaty amendment. But 
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residing in other Member States who will lose their EU citizenship status following the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU. Unexpectedly, EU citizens have been transformed into ‘guests’ or 
‘foreigners’ in communities they call ‘their own’.9 Similarly, if the forthcoming Brexit 
negotiations yield no agreement, former EU citizens would have to apply for either 
permanent residence or naturalisation in the countries in which they reside. As expected, the 
uncertainty surrounding the status of EU citizens has given rise to distress, confusion and 
considerable debate at national and EU levels.  
At the same time, the process of the ‘othering’ of EU citizens in the UK, that is, their 
depiction as EU migrants and foreigners in official discourses, the media and in 
administrative practices has already commenced.
10
 Their identities and lives are looked upon 
completely differently from the previous year. A new system of relevancies emerges 
anchored in British nationality or ‘in-group’ status. 
In this article, I examine various citizenship templates following the activation of 
Article 50 TEU and engage in institutional design thinking. By combining top-down and 
bottom-up perspectives, that is, ‘how institutions think’ (Douglas, 1986) or ‘seeing like a 
state’ (Scott, 1998) as well as citizens’ views and vision, I discuss possible policy options 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
compare the related European Citizen Initiative at http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-
initiative/public/initiatives/open/details/2017/000005. 
9
 1.22 million UK nationals reside in other Member States. The most recent Census showed that 2.68 million 
people from other EU countries live in the UK. However, the Labour Force Survey estimated that 3.16 million 
nationals of EU countries live in the UK; see House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper on Migration Statistics, 
Number SN06077, 25 October 2016, pp. 23-26. 
10
 An increase in racially motivated crime following the referendum was noted by official statistics in the UK. 
Mr Arkdiusz Jozwik was beaten to death in a racially motivated attack in Essex and at a vigil for him two Polish 
men were assaulted.   
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concerning the status of EU citizens affected by Brexit and differentiated citizenship 
arrangements (a scala civium) and argue that there is room for institutional innovation in the 
domain of citizenship. 
The discussion is structured as follows. In section II, I deploy an analytical lens in 
order to theorise citizenship and its governance in the EU and to differentiate national 
citizenship from EU citizenship. Section III discusses the domicile paradigm which features 
at the top of the normative agenda for the development of EU citizenship and argues that it 
would have a limited applicability to citizenship rights post-Brexit. The advantages and 
disadvantages of possible citizenship or permanent residence templates at national level are 
explored in section IV. Section V presents, and defends, the proposal for a special EU 
protected citizen status for both EU citizens living in the UK and UK nationals living in other 
Member States while section VI contains the concluding remarks. 
   
II. Isolating Questions of Concept 
Engaging in institutional design thinking and contemplating citizenship templates post-Brexit 
requires a prior attention to the concepts of national citizenship and European Union 
citizenship. The European Union has had a multi-layered citizenship regime, within which 
national, subnational, supranational citizenships have been nested and interlocked (for early 
accounts see Meehan, 1993; Preuss, 1995; Weiler, 1995; Kostakopoulou, 1996; O’Leary, 
1996; de Burca, 1996; Wiener and Della Sala, 1997). The Brexit outcome of the referendum 
has brought forth their possible disentanglement. In this section, I deploy an analytical lens in 
order to examine national and European Union citizenships and to clarify their differences. 
This is envisaged to provide the background for discussing below how these citizenships 
could be disentangled and the possible absorption of complex citizenship by national 
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citizenship. Although such a change would be a subtraction and subtractions unavoidably 
lead to reduced possibilities, I will intentionally refrain from perceiving Brexit as an indicator 
of the resilience of national citizenship and, accordingly, of the alleged fragility of EU 
citizenship and, more generally speaking, of forms of postnational citizenship.  
  European Union citizenship has been conditioned on either the possession or the 
acquisition of national citizenship since its formal establishment by the Treaty on European 
Union (1 November 1993). Although it is formally a derivative citizenship (i.e., only 
nationals of the Member States can be EU citizens), it differs from national citizenship in a 
number of ways. The most important difference is that Union citizenship is premised on 
mobility, that is, on national border crossings and on the prohibition of discrimination on the 
ground of nationality.
11
 National citizenship, on the other hand, has been a sedentary status. 
Owing to its close links with territorially bound communities organised as nation-states, 
national citizenship has been internally inclusive and externally exclusive (Goodin, 1996; 
Baubock, 2007). An inclusive ‘we’, that is, a public consisting of national and naturalised 
citizens, is juxtaposed to others, that is, to foreigners or non-nationals. So, whereas at the 
national level heterogeneity or ethnic diversity has been used as a justification for the 
exclusion of racial, ethnic and national minorities and for measures designed to promote 
national cohesion, for the European Union it is a source of strength and unity. Heterogeneity 
is thus seen to be a premise for co-existence, connectivity and the development of 
multifarious associative relations.   
In addition, whereas national citizenship needs socially legitimating myths, ‘big 
ideas’, rituals and symbols in order to perform its integrative functions, EU citizenship is a 
juridico-political institution. It has not has not established a sacrificial culture and has not 
turned domestic societies into societies of control and surveillance. It has merely conferred 
                                                          
11
 See, for instance, European Council (1985), Adonnino Report, Bull. EC (Suppl) 7/85. 
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rights directly on Union citizens which are enforceable before national as well as European 
Union courts. More importantly, it has done so without eroding national cultures. By so 
doing, it has confirmed Wildavsky’s (1987, p. 11) observation that it is wrong to believe that 
inconsistent cultures do not (- or cannot) cohere (see also Kratochwil, 2001). Of course, the 
exercise of EU citizenship rights is bound to rub off against the settled powers of the state 
and national administrative authorities thereby causing irritations and frictions. And 
irritations provoke criticism and, on occasions, resistance, but neither states nor cultures have 
been eroded by it. Accordingly, workers, work-seekers, self-employed persons, students, 
pensioners, persons of independent means, family members of Union citizens, service 
recipients and posted workers, all have been encouraged to exercise their free movement 
rights and, through their citizenship practices (Wiener, 1998; Magnette, 2005), they have 
formed direct bonds with the European Union.
12
 
A broader, more cosmopolitan political community has thus emerged in the European 
setting due to institutional efforts to overcome the disabilities of ‘alienage’ and national 
discriminatory and restrictive practices. Occupational barriers anchored on nationality, 
national protectionism and even unnecessary obstacles to free movement and residence have 
been progressively removed so that ‘outsiders’ can become ‘insiders’ and rightful participants 
in the host societies. This radical normative change
13
 has enriched socio-political life and has 
revealed the admirable working of the logic of equality. By respecting human beings and 
treating them equally, dynamic and open societies are created. The logic of equality, or to be 
more precise of equalisation, thus triggers a complete shift of perspective in how one thinks 
                                                          
12
 See Standard Eurobarometer 81, European Citizenship Report, Spring 2014: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb81/eb81_citizen_en.pdf. 
13
 Akerlof and Kranton (2011) have commented that one of the most radical regime changes is a change in the 
norms of who is an insider and who is an outsider.  
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about community, the bonds that tie citizens together and what can be legitimately required 
on the part of human beings for their admission into bounded communities. Integration is a 
matter of socio-political inclusion. In contrast, the logic of national identity underpinning 
national citizenship demands the conversion of ‘aliens’ into co-nationals, that is a process of 
dis-identification and re-identification with a view to their reclassification as members of the 
body politic. Here, naturalisation is a state device for controlling membership and filtering 
out movement.     
Premised on different foundations and having a different rationale, EU citizenship has 
not demanded the naturalisation of EU citizens in the Member State of residence. It has 
shifted the boundaries of membership from the outside through the conferral of rights to 
citizens which the Member States need to respect and enforce. True, the recognition of EU 
citizens as resource bearers and ‘pantoporoi’,14 that is, capable of going everywhere, has been 
called into question in the UK and elsewhere. But irrespective of the new interpretations of 
free movement of persons in the post-Brexit landscape, we cannot sidestep the differences 
between EU and national citizenships for this would leave us with a partial understanding of 
the law and policy options concerning the status of the EU citizens affected by Brexit. 
  
III. Isolating Normative Questions and Desirable Reforms 
In section II I examined the conceptual issues surrounding national and European Union 
citizenships and discussed their differences. These differences have been the point of 
departure for innovative thinking about EU citizenship. Before proceeding to discuss options 
for the citizenship policy challenges facing the UK and the European Union in the post-Brexit 
                                                          
14
 I have borrowed this expression from Sophocles’ Antigone (Verses 360-361): ‘pantoporos: aporos ep’ouden 
erchetai to mellon’.  Compare Fligstein (2008). 
 8 
 
landscape, it is worth paying some attention to the normative agenda for the reform of EU 
citizenship and the domicile-based model of EU citizenship since UK nationals living in the 
EU could benefit from its future establishment. 
 Because the European Union lacks the commonalities, myths and symbolisms that 
have characterised national communities, scholars and policy practitioners argued in the 
1990s that its model of citizenship should not be based on Member state nationality. Instead, 
it should be based on a five-year lawful residence in the territories of the Union. Such a 
reform would transform EU citizenship into a genuinely postnational model of citizenship 
reflecting the complex interconnections that individuals have by virtue of living, working and 
participating in the socio-economic and political life of their place of residence (Preuss, 1995; 
Soysal 1995; Kostakopoulou, 1996, 2001; Shaw, 1997; Soysal, 1995; Maas, 2007; Kochenov 
and Plender 2012; Tonkiss, 2013; but compare Olsen, 2012). It would also provide a solution 
to the situation of UK nationals living in EU Member States following Brexit and it has been 
favoured by NGOs.
15
   
 In addition to being normatively defensible, grounding EU citizenship on domicile 
would instantiate Simmel’s (1949/50) notion of society as an inter-human reality. Reflecting 
on social relations in 1908, Simmel posed the pertinent question ‘How is Society possible?’. 
By contrasting nature with society, he argued that societal unification is based on connecting 
individuals and on their activities (Aradau, Huysmans and Squire, 2010). Understanding, love 
and common work make individuals societal members; they come to recognise concrete 
others as ‘fellow sociates’. According to Simmel (1923), each social element (each 
individual) is interwoven with the life and activities of every other, and this produces the 
external framework of society.  
                                                          
15
 I have in mind NGOs, such as New Europeans, Europeens sans frontiers and the European Citizenship 
Foundation. For a full explication of EU citizenship based on domicile, see Kostakopoulou (1996; 2001; 2008). 
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 The relating or connexive process of society creates communities of ‘concern and 
engagement’ (Kostakopoulou, 1996; 2001). This has important implications for national 
citizenship and identity since it severs the link between national communities and the 
enjoyment of political rights. By transcending the ordering process of society on which 
national statist communities have been built, the future development of EU citizenship could 
include the grant of voting rights in national parliamentary elections to EU citizens, the 
formation of transnational political parties and the revision of the restrictive procedural 
requirements surrounding the European Citizens’ Initiative.16 Being together in welfare and 
in a common political life in a common European space would also require the recognition of 
social rights and duties (Ferrera, 2009; Maas, 2014) and the establishment of a European 
solidarity fund and of a minimum basic income allowance.
17
 Additional reforms might 
include the strengthening of the links between European institutions and the European civil 
society,
18
 the more effective protection of national and ethnic minorities (Carrera, 2014), and 
coordinated action to tackle obstacles to the family reunification of EU citizens and the 
resurgence of discrimination, xenophobia and racism in austerity-ridden Europe. All these 
                                                          
16
 The European Citizens’ Initiative is based on Article 11(4) TEU and was an innovation introduced by the 
Lisbon Treaty. Between 1 April 2012 and 1 August 2016, 56 ECIs were proposed and 29 were registered. 
However, the success rate was very low. See http://www.citizens-initiative.eu/#home. 
17
 See Philippe Van Parijs (2004). A number of proposals have also been made by Herwig Verschueren, 
‘European citizenship: not for the poor’, Paper presented at the 23rd International Conference of Europeanists 
Philadelphia, April 14-16, 2016.        
18
 See ECIT’s proposals for a stronger, inclusive and coherent European citizenship, Brussels, 29 August 2016. 
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reforms would enhance democratic participation and provide opportunities for the 
empowerment of citizens.
19
  
What should be mentioned here is that, although the existing political climate might 
not be receptive to a transformative European Union citizenship agenda, it is important not to 
lose sight of the fact that existing institutional limitations and non-receptive political 
environments tend to serve as both barriers and invitations to further institutional reform. In 
this respect, the subsequent discussion on citizenship templates should not be taken to imply 
that the normative agenda for the development of EU citizenship should be forgotten and that 
the domicile paradigm of EU citizenship serves no use.  
 
IV. The Law of the Excluded Middle: Opening the Naturalisation Gates Or 
Permanent Residence 
Although the normative proposals for the development of EU citizenship continue to inspire 
the activities of non-governmental organisations and the European civil society,
20
 if an 
intergovernmental solution to the position of former EU citizens is sought during the Brexit 
negotiations, EU citizens who are resident in the UK and UK nationals resident in other 
Member States will be offered either permanent leave to remain or the option of applying for 
national citizenship.
21
 In fact, given that the UK and other Member States have viewed EU 
                                                          
19
 In addition to these reforms, for the incorporation of a humanist perspective see The Human Face of the EU 
(Nuno Ferreira and Dora Kostakopoulou, eds., 2016). 
20
  See note 14 above.  
21
 The public international law concept of ‘acquired’ or ‘vested’ interests in unlikely to apply because, unlike 
the ECHR, the EU Treaties do not provide for acquired rights and Article 70 of the Vienna Convention applies to 
states as parties of international treaties - it is not concerned with the legal position of individuals.  See the 
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citizenship as interfering with their right to treat the holders of that citizenship as foreigners 
(Guild, 2014, p. 424), Brexit might give rise to claims to make the determination of the status 
of EU citizens ‘a purely internal situation’ triggering the application of domestic procedures 
and laws.
22
  
The procedure of applying for permanent residence or indefinite leave to remain is 
one of them. The latter entails the freedom to enter, live and work the country of residence 
either indefinitely or initially for a prescribed period of time (e.g., for ten years in France and 
five years in Italy), but it can also be revoked in certain circumstances. In order for one to 
travel outside the country of residence, (s)he would have to use his/her nationality passport 
and to obtain a visa as a national of the country of origin. In several Member States, an 
individual cannot apply for national citizenship without acquiring first permanent residence. 
In addition, several Member States condition the grant of permanent residence on civic 
integration requirements, including linguistic requirements, employment status and financial 
stability. In the UK, permanent EU citizens, that is, those who have lived in the UK for five 
years, have been offered a ‘settled status’ which would grant equal access to healthcare, 
education, benefits and pensions, but excludes the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the 
EU as well as the full range of rights EU citizens enjoy at present by virtue of EU law. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Study on ‘The impact and consequences of Brexit on acquired rights of EU citizens living in the UK and British 
citizens living in the EU-27’, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, European 
Parliament, April 2017. On 22 June 2017, Mrs May, the British Prime Minister, proposed a new ‘settled status’ 
for EU citizens living in the UK which would grant equal rights in ‘healthcare, education, benefits and pensions’ 
in Brussels. Mrs Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, characterised Mrs May’s offer as ‘a good start’; The 
Guardian, 23 June 2017; The Times, 23 June 2017.   
22
 In reality, this cannot be an internal situation since the residence of EU citizens has been authorised by EU 
law and thus there is a connecting factor with it; see A. Tryfonidou (2009).  
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British Prime Minister made the offer of a ‘settled status’ conditional upon reciprocal 
arrangements for the UK citizens living in the EU.
23
 However, under EU law, UK nationals 
living in the EU legally and continuously for a period of five years would automatically 
become EU long-term residents under Directive 2003/109.
24
 Under the Directive, the host 
Member States can demand compliance with national integration measures (Article 5(2)), 
request evidence of stable and regular resources, and can reject an application on grounds of 
public policy or public security. The rights afforded to recipients of this status are inferior to 
those attached to EU citizenship status and the Directive does not confer true free movement. 
It confers a right to reside for more than three months in a second Member State subject to 
certain conditions and the labour market situation of the Member State concerned (Articles 
14 and 15). Given these limitations, coupled with the facts that permanent residence can be 
revoked in many circumstances, does not grant full citizenship rights (including the right to 
vote in all elections and to stand for office), often functions as a gate for the acquisition of 
nationality and it lapses if permanent residents spend a short period away from the country of 
residence (two years in the case of the UK), most former EU citizens are likely to find 
naturalisation more attractive.     
  Naturalisation would lead to the absorption of the status of EU citizenship by national 
citizenship. Such a proposal would be consonant with Eurosceptic and nationalist ideology 
which favours a restrictive notion of national citizenship and clearly demarcated boundaries 
between nationals/members and non-nationals/foreigners. In fact, nationalism has been based 
                                                          
23
 N. 21 above. 
24
 Directive 2003/109/EC on the status of long-term residents OJ L 16 of 25.11.2003. Highly skilled UK nationals 
could invoke Directive 2009/50/EC and would be issued with an EU Blue Card; Directive 2009/50/EC on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, 
OJ L 155/17 of 29.5.2009.  
 13 
 
on what might be termed ‘the law of the excluded middle’, that is, on clear distinctions 
between members and non-members, ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ (Kohn, 1967; Smith, 1979). According 
to its ethnic variant, the national community is premised on a shared ethnicity (ethnic 
nationalism) while civic nationalism relies on the commonalities of a common culture, 
history, language or values which non-nationals allegedly do not share (Breuilly, 1993; Miller 
1996).  
Under the law of the excluded middle, fuzzy membership or shades of membership, 
such as denizenship, are not easily accommodated. Non-national residents can enter into 
associative relations but they are not formally included in the polity; they do not belong to the 
nation in a political or cultural sense. Complexity, hybrid identities and plural senses of 
belonging also disrupt the ‘closed sets’ of nationalist thinking (Gellner, 1964; Anderson, 
1983). This explains why EU citizenship has been perceived to be a rather dangerous 
supplement by nationalist parties and elites since its establishment at Maastricht. As 
highlighted in sections I and II above, it blurs the distinction between members and non-
members by granting citizenship rights, including electoral rights and a right to equal 
treatment, to non-national EU citizens in the Member State of residence.  
  If the law of the excluded middle prevails and the solution to the question concerning 
the status of EU citizens is sought within the domain of national citizenship, then both the 
UK and the other Member States would embark upon a horizontal opening of the citizenship 
gate in order to include EU citizens living in the UK and UK citizens living in other Member 
States. At first sight, this might appear to be a simple, natural and feasible policy option. In 
reality, however, it has an inner complexity. I envisage two distinct possibilities here. First, it 
might be agreed that ordinary naturalisation procedures should apply to EU citizens. This 
would mean that they would have to satisfy all the requirements applying to third country 
nationals before being granted nationality by public authorities. These include civic and 
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linguistic requirements, participation in citizenship ceremonies and public oaths, in addition 
to meeting the ordinary residency requirements which in some Member States are quite long 
(10 years).
25
 If an investigation on the merits of this option is carried out, one can quickly 
discern numerous difficulties. 
First, the variability of naturalisation laws in the 28 Member States would result in 
divergence and inequalities in the treatment of EU citizens.
26
 Their status would essentially 
depend on a Member State lottery. Variations in naturalisation laws will be accompanied by 
variations in processing times and naturalisation rates across the Member States. The 
European Union itself will not be able to step in to protect former EU citizens who are placed 
at the risk of national discretion and/or erroneous decision-making. Secondly, in those 
Member States that do not permit dual or multiple nationality, the voluntary acquisition of the 
nationality of that state will result in the loss of their Member State nationality thereby 
placing certain EU citizens in an invidious position. Interestingly, in the EU, twenty two 
Member States permit multiple nationality, while Denmark, Norway, Estonia and Lithuania 
require the renunciation of the former nationality upon the voluntary acquisition of their 
nationalities without exception. Poland and the Netherlands require this, too, under certain 
conditions. Thirdly, it would be difficult to justify the conversion of EU citizens into 
nationals through tests, classes, oaths and citizenship ceremonies. The new taxonomy of 
citizenship consisting of the ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ will be seen to be an unnecessary and costly 
imposition as well as being wholly unsuitable for EU citizens who have been incorporated 
                                                          
25
 The residency requirements vary significantly; Spain, Slovakia, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania require 10 years’ 
continuous residence whereas Belgium and Portugal require 5 and 6 years, respectively. Most other EU 
Member States require a residency period of 7-8 years. For more details, see Sarah Wallace Goodman’s 
analysis on www.eudo-citizenship.eu. Compare also de Groot, 1998; 2006. 
26
 For an excellent analysis, see the national reports on EUDO, EUI, Florence. 
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into host societies and have been treated as rightful participants until now. It would deny their 
formal co-equality, with the exception of electoral rights at national parliamentary elections. 
In addition, by creating a new positional relativity which would invite executive discretion, 
that is, the rejection of naturalisation applications from EU citizens who are deemed to be 
‘undesirable’ or ‘not yet ready for full inclusion and citizenship’, the evolutionary sequence 
of naturalisation may look at first sight incorporative, but, in reality, is founded on distancing, 
separation and discrimination.  
Because of these weaknesses, a different policy option might be preferable. The 
second option would be to exempt EU citizens from the normal naturalisation procedures and 
to facilitate their automatic or semi-automatic naturalisation by registration or by declaration 
of option. This would require an application for citizenship, but the process would be quick, 
more inclusive and non-discretionary. The UK and other Member States could in theory still 
require residency requirements and the absence of a criminal record. They could also 
differentiate between periods of residence. For instance, residence for a period exceeding ten 
years could prompt automatic naturalisation while shorter periods of residence would activate 
semi-automatic naturalisation. Naturalisation by declaration of option, on the other hand, 
would grant EU citizens the possibility of opting out from national citizenship if they wished 
to retain their citizenship of origin or not to compromise it in any other way.  
Although there are important differences among the policy options mentioned above, 
the latter is more normatively defensible bearing in mind EU citizens’ existing rightful 
membership. It does not assume the existence of deficiencies on the part of EU citizens which 
need to be overcome before their formal admission to the body politic. It recognises their 
‘enculturation’ and effective links with society. More importantly, it avoids the 
temporalisation of their presence and the concomitant impression that their status is 
precarious because they are easily removable. 
 16 
 
The policy of treating EU citizens as national citizens-to-be post-Brexit may appear to 
be feasible and appropriate from the standpoint of states, but it presupposes the reform of 
naturalisation laws in the Member States and conflicts with the rationale and status of 
European Union citizenship. The ‘why’ of it seems to be a preponderantly important 
question. In fact, as national citizenship is superimposed on EU citizenship, the latter’s 
emphasis on non-discrimination on the ground of nationality and equalisation is being side-
lined by a nation-centric logic which requires the conversion of ‘aliens’ into nationals via 
naturalisation, irrespective of the form this might take. But why should national citizenship 
be given methodological and political primacy since the rights EU citizens enjoy are derived 
from EU law and not from national laws? We need a more panoramic perspective. ‘Seeing 
like a state’ (Scott, 1998) is only a partial view. 
Yet, critics might object, here, this is the road that politics has travelled thus far. In 
what follows, I show that this is not the case and that Union citizenship must be taken more 
seriously. More importantly, EU citizens are not invisible,
27
 nor do they lead invisible lives. 
The EU cannot delegate their protection to the Member States, nor can it rely on the 
generosity of spirit of national elites. It has a duty to protect its citizens post-Brexit and to re-
affirm the normative and political weight of European Union citizenship.          
 
V.  The Alternative: A Special EU Protected Citizen Status 
If the naturalisation of EU citizens in the Member State of residence following Brexit is not 
an appropriate policy option for the reasons outlined in the foregoing section, indefinite leave 
to remain in the UK or long-term residence in other Member States does not guarantee 
                                                          
27
 N. 9 above.  
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security of residence and a panoply of rights and a domicile paradigm for EU citizenship is 
ruled out on the grounds of political pragmatism (section III above), one needs to search for 
alternatives. The search for a more suitable policy option cannot disregard the conceptual and 
juridico-political underpinnings of EU citizenship (section I above) and the purposes which 
its founders had in view.  
Although the free movement provisions of the Treaty of Rome were viewed as an 
incipient form of EU citizenship by the European Commission in the early 1960s,
28
 it is, 
nevertheless the case, that the formal establishment of EU citizenship at Maastricht is the 
outgrowth of the idea of granting ‘EU nationals’29 special rights in the Member State of 
residence. Indeed, in the 1970s and the 1980s, the debate on creating ‘a People’s Europe’ was 
centred on the grant of special rights to EU nationals.
30
 The special rights included the right 
to vote and to stand as candidates in local elections in the Member State of residence. This 
was considered to strengthen the feeling of belonging to a single legal community. Although 
concerns about the impact of this proposal on national citizenships were expressed by the 
Member States, brave thinking led to the adoption of a proposal which promoted equalisation 
(i.e., Community nationals had to be treated as if they were citizens of these states) rather 
than the opening up of the naturalisation gates. Indeed, this option prevailed because ‘the 
emphasis should remain on residence rather than nationality’ (European Commission, 1975, 
p. 32).  Considering the historical trajectory of EU citizenship and the role played by the idea 
                                                          
28
 See ‘the Free Movement of Workers in the Countries of the European Economic Community’, Bull. EC 6/61, 
5-10. See also W. Hallstein (1972 [1969], pp. 173-4).  
29
 This is a term used by the institutions of the European Community at that time. It did not denote an 
assumed common European nationality. 
30
 European Council (1985), Adonnino Report, Bull. EC (Suppl) 7/85. For a detailed exposition of all the 
proposals, see Wiener (1998); Kostakopoulou (2001) and Maas (2007). 
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of creating special rights (common European rights), it is only natural that EU citizenship 
remains a special status for EU citizens living in the UK and UK nationals living in other 
Member States following Brexit.  
 Creating a special EU protected citizen status would ensure that all EU citizens 
affected by Brexit, that is, EU citizens living in the UK and UK nationals living in the EU, 
would continue to enjoy their EU citizenship rights and to be subject to the same conditions 
relating to their residence, employment and family reunification which apply to all other EU 
citizens. The only difference would be that this legal status would not be automatically 
transmittable to all those who would become members of their families following the entry 
into force of the UK’s withdrawal agreement. This group of people would have to rely on 
national laws and the ECHR for the protection of their rights. Needless to say, this EU 
protected citizen status would not materially change the existing rules governing the loss of 
the right of permanent residence, namely, (a) consecutive absence from the territory 
exceeding 24 months and (b) public policy, public security and public health considerations 
under Chapter VI of Directive 2004/38.
31
  
Such a special EU protected citizen status would not undermine national citizenship. 
It would merely maintain the legal effects of Union citizenship and ensure that the existing 
European Union citizenship space would not contract. Although the inspiration for such a 
special status is derived from the proposals on special rights that were on the European 
Community’s policy agenda in the 1970s and 1980s, it might be worth noting that there exists 
an institutional precedent in the field of citizenship and nationality law.  
In UK nationality law, the special status of British protected persons was established 
by the British Nationality Act 1948 (in force on 1 January 1949). It was built on a pre-
                                                          
31
 Note 4 above. 
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existing status conferred under the Royal Prerogative (see the British Protected Persons Order 
1938) which had imperial roots. The statutory British protected persons status was granted to 
individuals from territories which were originally British protectorates or protected states or 
states over which the Crown had exercised jurisdiction without their inclusion into the 
Crown’s dominions. The last such state was Brunei. It also included individuals from 
mandated and trust territories
32
 for which Britain had international responsibility. According 
to s. 32(1) of the 1948 British Nationality Act, British protected persons could naturalise or 
register as British subjects or citizens of the United Kingdom and the Colonies if they took an 
oath of allegiance to the Crown. They retained the status in so far as they did not acquire the 
citizenship of the state declaring independence or of any other country. Under the British 
Nationality Act 1948, they were excluded from migration controls. This status has been 
gradually phased out due to the limited opportunities for its transmission to the children of 
British protected persons (Blake, 1996, pp. 682 et seq.).  
Section 38(1) of the British Nationality Act 1981, which replaced the 1948 Act, stated 
that: ‘Her Majesty may by order in Council made in relation to any territory which was at any 
time before commencement: (a) a protectorate or protected state
33
 for the purposes of the 
1948 Act; or (b) a United Kingdom trust territory within the meaning of that Act, declare to 
be British protected persons for the purposes of this Act any class of persons who are 
connected with that territory and are not citizens of any country mentioned in Schedule 3 
which consists of or includes that territory’. Although the British protected persons status is 
                                                          
32
 Britain had been given administrative responsibility for mandated territories under the League of Nations 
and for trust territories by the United Nations after 1945. 
33
 The difference between protectorates and protected states was that Britain had established an internal 
administration in protectorates while protected states enjoyed internal autonomy. In both cases, defence and 
external relations were controlled by Britain. 
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considered to be a nationality status under public international law, it does not confer a right 
of abode in the United Kingdom itself and its beneficiaries are not exempt from immigration 
controls. On 1 January 1983, British protected persons were the citizens or nationals of 
Brunei, existing holders of the British protected persons status and those who were born 
stateless in the UK or an overseas territory because, when they were born, one of their parents 
was a British protected person. 
 Although critics could point out the colonial roots of the status and the violence 
associated with it,
34
 its historical existence does not negate the possibility of a different 
institutional design in the EU. It also demonstrates a generalised awareness of the 
responsibility of a political unit to protect individuals following political change as well as an 
acceptance of its complementarity with other nationality statuses. With respect to the latter, in 
Motala and Another it was held that: ‘A person born in a British Protectorate was a British 
protected person by reason of s.32(1) British Nationality Act 1948 read in conjunction with 
s.9(1)(a) British Protectorates, Protected States and Protected Persons Order in Council 1940 
SI.140. That status differed from that of a citizen of the UK and Colonies but one status 
added nothing to the other and it did not follow that one status was inconsistent with the 
other. Persons could be both citizens by descent and protected persons by birth.’35  
 Path dependencies and history may well provide inspiration for an EU protected 
citizen status for all those EU citizens affected by Brexit and the normative considerations 
examined above lend support for it. I believe that this proposal fits well into the constellation 
of analytical and normative ideas of which it is a part (sections I and II above). In what 
                                                          
34
 I recall, here, Robert Cover’s observation that law is laced with violence and that ‘legal interpretation takes 
place in the field of pain and death’; Robert Cover (1986, p. 1601). See also Austin Sarat and Thomas Kearns 
(eds.) (1992).  
35
 Motala and Another v. Attorney-General [1991] 3 WLR 903. 
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follows I would like to provide two additional justifications. The first justification is a legal 
one and is premised on the fundamental status of EU citizenship. The second justification, 
which centres on the question ‘whose duty is to protect EU citizens post-Brexit?’, furnishes 
an argument for the EU’s responsibility in this area.     
  Following a cautious approach during the first few years of the establishment of EU 
citizenship, the Court of Justice of the EU began to innovate and to create norms. In 
Grzelczyk, the Court ruled that ‘Union citizenship is destined to be a fundamental status of 
nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to 
enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality’.36 One year afterwards, it 
stated that Article 21(1) TFEU (formerly 18(1) TEC) is directly effective, that is, it confers 
rights that are enforceable before national courts.
37
 This rights-enhancing case law of the 
Court has made EU citizenship a norm which national and European authorities have to 
respect. Respect for citizenship as a fundamental status now requires the subjection of 
denationalisation (and naturalisation) decisions taken by Member States to judicial review
38
 
and the protection of EU citizen children and their third country national parents from 
expulsion from Member States as well as the Union as a whole, if such national measures 
would ‘[deprive] EU citizens of the substance of the rights attached to EU citizenship’.39 
Given the fundamental status of EU citizenship, any loss of EU citizens’ rights following 
Brexit would transform EU citizenship into a contingent status. My proposal for a special EU 
protected citizen status is thus consonant with the EU citizenship norm.   
                                                          
36
  Case C- 184/99 Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d’Aide Sociale d’Ottignes-Louvain- la Neuve [2001] ECR I- 6913, at 
para. 31.  
37
 Case C- 413/99 Baumbast and R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I- 7091. 
38
 Case C-135/08 Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I-1449. 
39
 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi (ONEM) [2011] ECR I-0000.  
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An additional justification can be derived from the direct, that is, independent, legal 
effect of rights that strike at the heart of EU citizenship law. These rights are premised on a 
direct bond between the EU legal order and individuals and thus do not depend on the 
Member States’ recognition40 or consent. In fact, it would contravene the principle of the full 
effectiveness of EU law
41
 and Union citizens’ legal positions which are protected by it, if a 
Union citizen found himself/herself stripped of all his/her rights overnight, totally 
unprotected in the territory of the host Member State. As Brexit interferes with individuals’ 
EU-based legal position and their free movement and residence rights, the European Union 
has the responsibility to step in and to protect vulnerable EU citizens.
42
 After all, EU law has 
been the source of their rights. Since European integration has authorised their ‘right to have 
rights’,43 it can be plausibly argued that it is the duty of the European Union to prevent the 
unilateral erasure of their citizenship status by a transient and slim majority in the United 
Kingdom. Accordingly, some form of continued EU citizenship status, such as the one 
proposed here, would provide a safety net for EU citizens, both EU citizens resident in the 
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 For a differing view, see P. Magnette (2007); F. Strumia (2013). 
  
41
 As the CJEU stated in Joined Cases C-46 and 48/93, the full effectiveness of Community rules and the 
effective protection of the rights which they confer are principles inherent in the Community legal order; 
Brasserie du Pecheur v Germany and R v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame [1996] ECR I-
1029. 
42
 Interestingly, the Stockholm Programme for the AFSJ which was adopted by the European Council in 
Brussels on 10-11 December 2009 had the subtitle ‘An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting the 
Citizen’. In its Action Plan on Implementing the Stockholm Programme, the Commission emphasised the 
European Union’s duty to ‘protect and project’ the values of respect for the human person and human dignity, 
freedom, equality and solidarity and to ensure that ‘citizens can exercise their rights’ (European Commission 
2010, p. 3). 
43
 This expression is borrowed from H. Arendt (1951). 
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UK and UK nationals resident in the EU, who find themselves being transformed overnight 
from rightful subjects to mere objects of political negotiations between the EU and the UK. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Legal norms should reflect social practices and citizens’ lived realities. Brexit has brought 
forth a new political reality which threatens to undo legal rights and to unsettle EU citizens’ 
lives. They have no power to contest this development and to object to their de-citizenisation 
and re-classification as either third country nationals living in the EU or EU citizens living in 
a third country. A decision taken by a transient majority on 23 June 2016, therefore, 
effectively shatters individuals’ lives, the life horizons they have built following decades of 
residence, socio-economic and (partial) political membership in the host Member States and 
the future of their families. It has also revealed the nationalist underbelly with all its 
unpleasant reactions, prejudices and assumed hierarchies. Accordingly, there is an urgent 
need to consider possible citizenship templates for more than four million people and to 
engage in institutional design thinking.  
Although either indefinite leave to remain or naturalisation in the state of residence 
might be seen to furnish a fully recognised status for EU citizens, I have argued that it is not 
an adequate policy option. The conceptual differences between national and EU citizenships 
are immense (section II above). The latter is based on non-discrimination on the ground of 
Member State nationality while the former is conditioned on nationality. At the same time, a 
domicile paradigm for EU citizenship (see section III above) would not help EU citizens 
living in the UK. By resisting the temptation to shut ourselves up in the present and apply the 
‘available’, other policy options might emerge. In this article I have explored the advantages 
and disadvantages of possible citizenship templates and have defended the idea of an EU 
protected citizen status. 
 24 
 
 Admittedly, this status is far from perfect in the light of the sophisticated normative 
agenda for the development of EU citizenship (section III above). In addition, it would 
effectively create a scala civium in the EU, that is, a system of graduated statuses. But, under 
the present circumstances, it would do justice to all those EU citizens who are enmeshed in 
their states of residence and have been sharing those states’ burdens without any complaints 
for years or decades. It would also continue to reflect the fundamental status of EU 
citizenship and to safeguard the freedom of relating to, and co-operating with, human beings 
without discrimination on the ground of nationality.  
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